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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, an increased demand for agricultural land has fuelled fears of a neocolonial land rush. This is associated with various risks to rural households' livelihoods, such as the loss of access to land, the exploitation of wage labourers or the damage of environmental buffer zones (German et al. 2013; Borras & Franco 2012; White et al. 2012; Vermeulen & Cotula 2010; White & Dasgupta 2010) . At the same time, these demands often meet seemingly abundant resources in developing countries and governments who aim, for example, to promote rural development, create employment, or bring in tax income (Deininger & Byerlee 2012; Görgen et al. 2009 ). The increased demand for land has thereby raised hopes for a renewed interest in developing countries' chronically underinvested agricultural sectors (OECD & FAO 2013 , UNCTAD 2013 World Bank 2008) . These opposing views illustrate a vibrant and continuous debate on "land grab or development opportunity" as coined by Cotula et al. (2009) . 1 Since 2009 a broad research community has focused on different aspects of largescale land acquisitions.
2 Studies by Deininger et al. (2011) , Cotula et al. (2011 Cotula et al. ( , 2009 ), Zoomers (2010) , and von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009) have revealed several drivers of the phenomenon: rapid population growth, a strong trend towards urbanisation, changing dietary preferences, and environmental concerns such as severe land degradation, desertification, and water shortages. Added to these are the increasing global and local demands for food, raw materials, forest products, renewable energy sources, ecosystem services, eco-tourism, and investment.
In-depth case studies elucidate processes of land acquisition, in particular the role played by different actors at different stages in the acquisition process; e.g. Burnod et al. (2013) and Wolford et al. (2013) on the role of the state; Nolte & Voget-Kleschin (2013) , Wisborg (2012) , Cotula & Vermeulen (2011) and Vermeulen & Cotula (2010) with a focus on local populations and consultation; Nolte (2013) on actors and institutions in Zambia and German et al. (2013) from a comparative perspective based on several cases in five African countries.
Evidence on impacts is still scarce. This is partly due to the temporal scope: while and Yaro (2013) point to the failure of a mango outgrower scheme where the project ignored the political ecology in Ghana. Väth (2013) and Cotula (2013: pp. 125 ) find evidence of both positive and negative effects. However, Cotula (2013) concludes that the negative aspects tend to outweigh positive ones.
Despite this growing evidence on impacts, there remains a lack of understanding on how these impacts are shaped by the institutional setting. To fill this gap, we emphasise the interplay of large-scale land acquisitions and the surrounding institutional environment. Our analysis focuses on the question 'How are land deals implemented?' To structure our study, we apply Williamson's (1998) four levels of social analysis. We work our way from general to specific factors, analysing the implementation of a land transaction against the background of three aspects of the land governance system: the land tenure system, the process of acquiring land, and the outcomes of this system.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. We explain our methodology and present the data, introduce our conceptual framework, and analyse, for Ghana and Kenya, the evolution of the land tenure system, the process of acquiring land, and the outcomes. We base this on a comparative analysis that aligns our empirical findings with our conceptual framework. In concluding we offer some policy recommendations.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
We use a comparative case study design (Dion 1998; Levy 2008; Gerring 2008; Gerring et al. 2011) , with two African countries as the case studies. 3 For each country we concentrate on one investment project initiated by a Western investor in a neglected rural area, which gives us an embedded case study, following Yin (2002: 42-43) . Comparing the two projects in the context of their respective countries allows us to examine the mechanisms guiding acquisition processes more comprehensively than a single case would. According to Gerring (2004) and Seawright & Gerring (2008) , an intensive study of a single unit (or a smaller class of units) also provides better grounded insights into the functioning of the land governance systems in general and interactions between its stakeholders in particular.
In this regard, we consider our study to be in line with Gerring's pathway case (2007) , which studies a crucial case to clarify a hypothesis. Similarly, our study offers an elucidation of the causal mechanisms that underlie large-scale land acquisitions.
Our empirical analysis draws on legal documents and on primary data gathered during field research in Ghana and Kenya in 2010 and 2011. We cannot expect to understand the practices involved in land acquisitions just by looking at the de jure legal framework as laid out in formal documents; we also require an in-depth analysis of de facto processes. We therefore conducted semi-structured interviews with a wide range of stakeholders at the national and local level. In addition, we facilitated focus group discussions with farmers in the region directly affected by the particular investment project, and with employees of the investors.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Land deals are implemented within a complex land governance system. To explain the mechanisms that drive implementation of large-scale land acquisition, we apply Williamson's (1998) four levels of social analysis as a conceptual framework to structure our study.
The first level comprises norms, customs and traditions that can be summarised as informal institutions. These are persistent, so changes at the first level usually take the form of very slow stepwise modifications of values over time. At the second level, which consists of formal institutions (i.e. the de jure legislation), changes can occur relatively fast: formal rules on paper can theoretically change overnight, though a far-reaching institutional reform process in a parliamentary system will be slower, requiring several rounds of technical and political validation. The informal and formal institutions are interconnected and they determine the 'rules of the game' -the governance system at the third level. We deviate from Williamson (1998) and medium and long-term outcomes that set in once the project is operational.
Our study focuses on the immediate effects of the acquisition process for the population on the local level, i.e. compensations. We further provide some insights into how the population perceives medium-to long-term impacts. We apply this analytical framework to the land governance systems of our case study countries and the respective investment cases.
While Williamson (1998) limits his analysis to feedback between two levels, we take into account feedback across all four levels. We thus assume -in line with
Williamson -that first and second level institutions have reciprocal feedback and that they determine the third level, the governing institutions. Moreover, we believe that the third level lays the groundwork for outcomes at the fourth level. However, going beyond Williamson, we further assume that these outcomes in turn send feedback to the first and second levels about formal and informal rules or institutions. As Figure 1 shows, our analysis is based on a conceptualisation of a system that encompasses these feedback mechanisms.
FIGURE 1
Conceptual Framework * * Own display, based on Williamson, 1998. To sum up, in order to examine how land deals are implemented, we first analyse the evolution of the land tenure system, looking at the first and the second levels of our proposed framework. We then analyse the land game on the third level, taking into account the general acquisition process and one example for each country. After this we analyse the socio-economic outcomes of this system on the fourth level. Finally, we synthesise the findings from these four levels by looking at changes in the land governance system induced by investment projects.
ANALYSIS
While the aim of our analysis was to compare the implementation of land deals in the two countries, our two case studies yielded different findings: the Ghanaian case was particularly revealing on aspects of compensation, whereas the Kenyan case produced more information on entrance of the investor. Hence, unlike present-day Western-style property rights systems, overlapping interests in land are common in the customary system.
Members of the clan have access to customary freehold because land as a source of livelihood traditionally belongs to the living, the dead, and the yet to be born (Osei 1998; Larbi et al. 1998; Mends 2006 Before the colonial days, customary law and Islamic Sharia law coexisted. The chieftaincy system was legally recognised by Britain as an instance of 'native administration' through which to implement 'indirect rule' (Kirk 1999) and at the same time additional interests in land were introduced under common law. Legal pluralism therefore expanded under colonial rule (Aryeetey et al. 2007a Art. 266 (4)).
Currently, state land in Ghana accounts for roughly 20% of the land surface, while the remaining 80% falls under customary land held by stools (in southern Ghana), skins (in northern Ghana) or families (for instance in the Volta Region) (Kasanga & Kotey 2001; Aryeetey et al. 2007b) . 7 Although these figures are rough estimates, they underline the strong role of the customary system to date (Anyidoho et al. 2008; Ubink & Amanor 2008 ) and indicate that investors often have to negotiate with chiefs to acquire large land tracts. However, the fact that common law interests in land, like leasehold, can be allocated on a plot that falls under customary land points to the possible tensions arising from the dual system in modern times.
A multitude of 166 Acts and their ambiguity have been hampering an efficient formal land rights system and proper enforcement for decades (Quaye 2006) , so people have become used to acting in legal grey areas (Interviews G15, G21). In 
Kenya
Up to today, Kenya has a dual system of land tenure -consisting of statutory and customary tenure with a multitude of (sometimes contradictory) statutes (Republic of Kenya 2009a) -that evolved over history. Before colonialism, several systems of land tenure existed in Kenya, most importantly the communal system of the Masai, the combined individual and familial system of the Kikuyu, and the feudal system of the Mumia kingdom (Alila et al. 1993) . settlement scheme (Leo 1978) , and land purchase programmes gave preference to
Kikuyus over other tribes (Kanyinga 2009 ).
After independence the dual system of land tenure was maintained. Land remained a source of conflict, particularly in the case of 'elite land grabbing'; that is, fraudulent allocation of public land to economically or politically influential people ( However, the process has been hasty, engagement of legislators and citizens has been lacking, and the content falls short of expectations (Manji 2012b ).
Even though pressure on land in Kenya is enormous, for example through population as the Tana River Delta, the Yala Swamp (like our example, Dominion Farms), and traditionally the area around Naivasha (for flowers) and Kericho (for tea).
The process of acquiring large tracts of land Ghana
The first step is to identify available land. For this task, it is usual to engage local professionals with a wide-ranging network (Interviews G17, G19). Another possibility for foreigners is to approach the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre, which is currently improving a database capturing stool land offered for investment projects (Interviews G17, G19, G20; GIPC 2013).
As the majority of land in Ghana is customary land, potential investors have to negotiate in most cases with chiefs and paramount chiefs (Interviews G15, G17, G19; for examples: Schoneveld et al. 2011; Amanor 2012; Wisborg 2012; Berry 2013) . By custom, the traditional council and the elders need to agree to negotiations in order to guarantee checks and balances (Interviews G15, G29; Kasanga & Kotey 2001 ).
In the second step, the investor receives the site plan from the chief and must initiate a comprehensive search at the archives of the Lands Commission, to check that the negotiating party is the legal owner and that there are not multiple claims on the land Once details have been agreed upon, the documents have to be handed in to the Regional Lands Commission to process the registration. If the land is located around Accra or Kumasi a title can be issued; in other parts of Ghana only deed registration is available (Interviews G16, G20; Kasanga & Kotey 2001) . Title registration is therefore conditional on announcing the transaction details at the site itself, at the respective district assembly and at the Regional Lands Commission. When 21 days have passed without any objection being raised, the registration process can be completed (Interview G16; Republic of Ghana 1986).
The annual rent, which is confirmed by the Lands Commission in the leasehold, will be paid to the Office of the Administrator of Stool Lands (Interviews G12, G23;
Republic of Ghana 1994a). This authority charges a 10% administrative fee. The rent is disbursed as follows: 55% to the district assembly, 25% to the chief and 20% to the traditional council (Interviews G12, G21, G23; Republic of Ghana 1994a).
After a land lease has finally been issued, an Environmental Impact Assessment 1994b, 1996) . This is the typical procedure for acquiring customary land. When it comes to state land, the Lands Commission takes the position of the chief as it is mandated to manage public and vested lands; it also collects the rents (Interviews G16, G20; Kasanga & Kotey 2001) . Investors therefore often favour state land as fewer actors are involved in the process and as this land is thought to offer higher tenure security (Interviews G15, G20). However, apart from land belonging to some divested stateowned companies, there is usually no state land available for investors (Interviews G19, G28).
In principle, the acquisition process is straightforward but in practice there are several weaknesses. First and foremost, there is no guarantee that investors will follow this procedure before they start operations. Schoneveld et al. (2011) ). The state has (given the present legislation) no power to interfere and design contracts (Interviews G20, G21). It is up to the chiefs and the traditional councils (and the investors) to decide whether they will seek free, prior and informed consent, so the local population is at risk of hearing about a deal only after the negotiation has been concluded (Interviews G15, G21). In addition, information about sustainable land prices ('drink money'), land rents and other negotiable benefits, such as local employment quotas, contract farming schemes, equity shares, or corporate social responsibility, are usually not available to negotiating chiefs (Interview G15).
Moreover, de facto accountability can be weak, so it is up to the chiefs whether they disclose the amount and the intended use of the 'drink money' (Interviews G15, G20; People living in this sparsely populated area were predominantly migrants. As they
were not bound to the land by social ties, they rejected a resettlement plan suggested by GOPDC and favoured cash compensation (AY & A Consult 2007; Interview G3; FGD G4). Consequently, the Land Valuation Board surveyed crops and housing structures but not the land itself (Interviews G1-G3, G7, G14; FGDs G4-G10). This was because GOPDC already possessed a land lease contract and because the migrants had neither statutory nor ancestral rights to use the land (Kobo, 2010) . The whole process, beginning with information and sensitisation, was characterised by an absence of transparency, and many irregularities and delays.
Our focus group discussions revealed a lack of free, prior, and informed consent.
While some people had been informed in a meeting with GOPDC (FGD G1), others only became aware of the acquisition due to the valuation activities of the Land Valuation Board (FGD G9) or only heard about the investment project from their chiefs (FGD G8). Altogether, the role of chiefs is very complex: they negotiate corporate social responsibility activities with GOPDC (Interviews G1, G2, G14) and are highly appreciated (Interview G15). Nevertheless, considering that some chiefs have misused their position to bargain for personal benefits, and that they collect rents for the same land (the Okumaning Concession) from different actors (GOPDC and migrants), criticism has been widely expressed (Interview G7; FGDs G4, G5, G7, G9).
Other mandatory legal procedures were followed overall by GOPDC, although there may have been a few exceptions where they did not comply. For private land the case is -in comparison -unproblematic, as negotiations are held with the former owner (Interview K3); leaving aside fraudulent land titles, the former ownership of private land is clear-cut. Investor and former owner (i.e. government, private owner, or communal authority) have to agree on a price, the 'stand premium', to be paid to the former owner. This price should reflect the value of the land but is negotiable. In addition, the investor has to pay an annual ground rent that is based on an official evaluation of the land, done by the Ministry of Lands. In the case of public land, an annual ground rent has to be paid to the government and in the case of community land to local authorities. On top of this, numerous statutory fees accrue in the process (Interviews K18, K19).
In all cases of investment in land -public, community, or private -the Ministry of Lands has to approve the transaction, register the land, and issue a lease certificate.
Once the lease has been taken and before the project actually starts, the investor has to undertake an Environmental Impact Assessment ( The local community was informed through church channels -in the words of one interviewee, 'they used religion to manifest the investment' (Interview K16 
Selected outcomes of the game GOPDC
In the case of GOPDC, resentment against the acquisition of the Okumaning Concession is widespread (FGDs G1-G12). In particular, participants of FGDs see the following negative immediate impacts: decreasing access to agricultural land (FGDs G1-G12), and low and late compensation (FGDs G1-G10). Moreover, as compensation was not paid for the land itself, the amounts calculated by the Land Valuation Board were inadequate to restore the migrants' livelihoods (FGDs G1-G8, G10). Furthermore, people who used to live or farm at Okumaning Concession reported that after they had left the land, five years went by before compensation was paid (FGDs G1, G4-G9). 15 The fact that people only received a check with the aggregated sum (FGDs G2-G7, G10) increased the suspicion that they were being tricked by their own government.
In terms of medium-to long-term impacts, participants criticise low wages (FGDs G1-G3, G11), casual labour contracts (FGDs G1-G3, G5, G7, G11), low corporate social responsibility (FGDs G1-G12), increased food prices in the area (FGDs G1-G12), and low retail prices for fresh oil palm fruit (Interview G5; FGDs G11, G12).
Nonetheless, in most of the focus group discussions participants did not deny they had received benefits like employment creation (FGDs G1-G4, G7-G12), better road infrastructure (FGDs G1-G4, G7, G8, G10-G12), electricity (FGDs G1-G4, G7, G8, G12), and improved health and schooling facilities (FGDs G1-G8, G10-G12).
Since GOPDC extended production, conflicts have accrued: in the beginning, the land of the Kwae Concession seemed ample, but as soon as areas closer to villages were affected by the investment, tensions arose with neighbouring communities (Interview G8; FGD G12). The Company responded by establishing a smallholder scheme for those who had lost their farms (Interviews G7, G8; FGD G12). In order to run the mill efficiently and foster economic integration, the Company also increased its access to fresh oil palm fruit (by contracting outgrower farmers 16 who could prove that they would have secure land use rights for at least 25 years, the period of the contract) (Interviews G5, G6). The Company also made purchases from independent farmers. With its nucleus-estate system with more than 2,000 plantation workers, 200 smallholders, and more than 7,000 outgrowers, GOPDC is identified as a driver of development in the region (Interviews G1-G3, G10, G11, G13, G14;
FGDs G1-G4, G7, G8, G10-G12).
However, criticism is not limited to GOPDC but includes the chiefs and the government. As a focus group participant said, 'the chief has misled [us], the investor could not know. A portion of blame can be also given to the government' (FGD G4). Given the important role of the chief, it is obvious that benefits for the local population are not institutionalised but rather depend on the chief's goodwill and his capacity to negotiate.
Dominion Farms
In the Kenyan investment case, the most pertinent immediate impact is the loss of access to land. The land Dominion uses is no longer available for pastoral activities, fishing, and seasonal agriculture during the dry months. Furthermore, more and more people move into the now arable areas once the land has been cleared and drained by the company. When Dominion then starts claiming the land for its own use these people are driven out.
Adverse medium-to long-term impacts, such as food insecurity, and damage to health caused by chemicals and working in the rice fields, are mentioned by participants in all our FGDs. While statements like 'Of course Dominion is very negative -that I have no doubt about -when they came they were good but they have kept on deteriorating year by year' (FGD K5) were frequent in conversations with affected communities, positive impacts could not be denied at the same time.
Long-term improvements in employment, and in infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, health centres, and schools, were named in particular (Interviews K10-K12; FGDs K1-K8). According to the season, between 200 and 1,600 casual, contract, and permanent employees are working for Dominion (Interviews K9, K14).
Heavy resistance from community members (see for example Ochieng 2011) has worsened over the last years. In the beginning, enthusiasm about Dominion Farmsclearly the most influential project in the region -was the dominant view. However, once the project moved from construction to actual farming activities, less employment than expected was generated and frustration set in. For instance, one participant in a focus group discussion claimed that 'the negativity came in 2006 during the transition between construction and farming when most of the workers became redundant and they could not all continue working with Dominion' (FGD K8). Many blame Dominion for this messy situation; others hold the government responsible, as a focus group discussion participant observed: 'So it is worth saying that Dominion did not grab our land but the government, because the government took our land and gave it to foreigners' (FGD K1).
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS
To align our analysis with the conceptual framework, we start with a brief systematic comparison between Ghana and Kenya. The stepwise analysis shows that the land legislation in both countries is not clear-cut, and thus the implementation of formal land laws is very loose. Many actors who acquire land operate in the legal grey areas.
This is a consequence of ambiguous land tenure systems with weak monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms. Hence, in both cases, official legal procedures are not necessarily followed. This is exemplified by the cases GOPDC and Dominion Farms, which produced outcomes perceived as ranging from very negative to positive.
While we cannot describe the full impact of large-scale agricultural projects (with regard to social differentiation or different time horizons), we can elucidate underlying causal mechanisms by looking at our findings in greater detail against the conceptual framework.
With respect to informal institutions, the Ghanaian system is backed by strong customary rules that are widely accepted by the society. Nevertheless, some traditional authorities' behaviour when it comes to leasing out large land tracts is heavily debated and criticised. This indicates that informal institutions are under pressure, which might lead to slow shifting of the rules. In Kenya, the customary system is much weaker. However, elite rule as an informal way of governing land is coming under increasing pressure.
In both case study countries, land is not solely a production factor but also connected with cultural identity and religious beliefs. Land issues are complex, and thus a consensus-based change in the formal institutions is also complex. However, both Interviews K15, K20). Similarly, the Ghanaian civil society fears that those in power have intentionally withheld the Draft Bill until 2013 in order to hold on to the power guaranteed by the present system (Interview G15).
As first and second level institutions are changing to different degrees, we analyse which set of rules investors follow when 'playing the land game' (third level). As there is no clear guidance by the governing institutions (first and second level) and as the correct procedure is time intensive, some investors bypass formal institutions.
Foreign investors do not know how to move in the legal grey areas: they lack the tacit knowledge required to adhere to informal institutions or make strategic use of them (which might be an advantage enjoyed by domestic investors). Thus, they are tempted to engage with local professionals or to enter the 'land game' through unknown, dubious channels. This can provoke popular outrage if unveiled (as happened in the Qatari case mentioned above). Overall, the current 'game' of largescale land acquisitions in Ghana and Kenya is played in a de facto 'institutional selfservice shop': investors decide themselves how they will enter the country depending on the discretion for action allowed by the host country's key actors, such as highlevel politicians, civil servants in land-and environment-related agencies, businessmen, or traditional authorities.
Consequently, analysis on the fourth level reveals that outcomes are diverse and range from positive to very negative. We assume that they are arbitrary depending on the investor's strategy as well as on the above-mentioned key actors. Accordingly, investors have substantial influence on crucial aspects, such as informing the local population, being environmentally accountable and distributing factor inputs including labour and produce. This can lead to insufficient consultation of the local communities. Those being worst affected by negative impacts are dissatisfied as they are often left out of the whole process. This discontent may in turn contribute to a shift in first and second level institutions (at least in countries with a democratic orientation and an active civil society, such as Ghana and Kenya). We can thus assert that large-scale land acquisitions can fuel institutional change.
Hence we can say in summary that it is not only the land governance system that shapes land deals but also the reverse: high numbers of large-scale land acquisitions put the land governance system under pressure to change; or, put differently, they have a feedback effect on the system.
CONCLUSIONS
We can summarise four main findings of our comparative embedded case studies as follows:
Firstly, an examination of procedures followed in large-scale land acquisitions reveals the present land governance system as inadequate to cope with the increasing pressure on land resources. The present systems are a result of the recognition of pre-colonial customary land tenure systems and statutory laws introduced by colonial powers, which were partly amended and adjusted for by postindependence rulers. Notwithstanding the intense wave of reform since the 1990s, in both countries the system is still a collection of miscellaneous rules and regulations with overlaps and loopholes, rather than a consistent legal framework. Against the global trend of increasing pressure on land resources, the present systems seem to be poorly designed to cope with these challenges. To address this problem, continuous effort to pursue the institutional reform processes is therefore crucial.
Secondly, the procedure generally followed (de facto) does not conform to the procedure laid down by the legislation (de jure) . This is partly because the legislation is confusing, and partly because the formal rules are poorly implemented and enforced. Poor enforcement is a consequence of understaffed and underfinanced government institutions and low institutional capacity. In both countries, the lack of a computerised land registry is one of the main reasons for 'skipping the queue' and other illegal actions, which clearly contravene the legislation. We suggest not only technical reform, but also far-reaching capacity development at all levels to overcome these challenges. Some may misuse the 'institutional self-service shop' to find loopholes to escape regulations. Such behaviour encourages rent-seeking and elite capture at all levels.
Even though both phenomena are not new, they have become so widespread as to provoke resistance by the local population, civil society organisations, and the international community. In the recent past, projects first failed because of local protest. In this regard, the pressure on the land governance system is increased not only by the rising demand for land, but also by the growing dissatisfaction of the excluded local population and investors who fear that conflicts will hinder operations. Hence, large-scale land acquisitions in agricultural land can trigger institutional reform of both the formal and the informal institutions that govern a land tenure system. Taking into account, that a shift in formal institutions improves 'the rules of the game' only if it is supported by informal institutions, we see awareness creation, including public education and open discourse, as important for changing mindsets.
Although we found variations in the way the large-scale agricultural projects in our case studies were implemented, we identified similar problems for both countries which we believe to be applicable for a larger set of land deals. Acknowledging that investors' actions have repercussions for the land governance system, we suggest there may be a window of opportunity here for policy makers, investors, and the local population to discuss the land governance system and shift its parameters towards more efficiency, given the sub-optimal outcomes of many land deals.
However, from a scientific point of view, more research is needed to fully understand how the recent investment boom in agricultural land shifts the future investment climate and the underlying regulatory framework. NOTES 1. The term "land grab" is widely used in media and NGOs, development organizations prefer terms such as "land-based investment", or "agricultural investment". While every term implies a certain stance in the debate, we refrain from using them and settle on neutral terms like "large-scale land acquisition", "land deal" or simply "project".
2. The topic is now appearing in many academic journals like the Journal of Peasant Studies, including several special issues: e.g. Development and Change (2013, Vol. 44, 2) , Globalizations Land owned by such a group is referred to as 'stool land' (Republic of Ghana 1999). A 'skin' in northern Ghana is equivalent to a 'stool' in southern Ghana.
7. The present constitution also recognises private land under common law under the category of customary land because it originates from gift or sale by the allodial right holder before 1992. A freehold title under common law can be held only by Ghanaians (Republic of Ghana 1992: Art. 266
(2)).
8. For more detailed accounts of the Kenyan land tenure system and conflicts with regard to the 'land question' see Syagga (2006 Syagga ( , 2011 , Kanyinga (2009), and Lonsdale (1992a,b) .
9. These categories emerged historically. In the colonial days, Kenya had only crown land and compensations for farmland and cultivated crops. At the same time compensation for the use of communal forest resources was not paid at all (FGDs G11, G12). However, after more than three decades the acquisition process cannot be exactly reconstructed.
14. Even though GOPDC had the legal right to use the land for which it pays ground rent to the Lands Commission, it abstained from using 2,343 hectares of its 8,359 hectares concession because further expansion would have required the destruction of old-established villages and the Apam shrine, a cultural heritage (Interview G7).
15. According to the Lands Commission, inflationary adjustment took place for delayed payments, but we were unable to gain detailed information on this.
16. We define 'outgrowers' as farmers who enter into a contract with GOPDC for a period of 25 years. While the Company offers inputs, credit, and extension, the outgrower contributes labor and land. This land is either owned or leased for 25 years. In case of a lease, the landlord also has to sign the contract. In contrast, GOPDC also provides the land for participants in the smallholder schemes.
